Moscow and Constantinople: Who Stands to Gain?

On January 6, 2019, His All-holiness, Patriarch Bartholomew, on behalf of the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, will formally issue the Tomos (or "Proclamation") of Autocephaly for the newly-constituted Church of Ukraine to the newly-elected primatial hierarch of this new autocephalous Church, His Beatitude Metropolitan Epiphanius of Kiev.

The event is most controversial, perhaps the most serious controversy affecting the Orthodox world during my lifetime, and has already resulted in the Moscow Patriarchate essentially excommunicating the Ecumenical Patriarchate (and all its clergy and faithful).  The Patriarchate of Moscow has protested the move on several grounds, accusing the Ecumenical Patriarchate (and His All-holiness Patriarch Bartholomew personally) of all sorts of motives (political and even financial!) and violations of the Holy Canons.  The Ecumenical Patriarchate has defended itself by claiming canonical and traditional prerogatives.

Without any doubt, this is a "political" controversy, for the rivalry between Moscow and Constantinople is long standing--centuries long in some respects.  Likewise, there is a continuing dispute between the Ukrainian and Russian governments.  Without doubt, the accusations and defenses of all sides (Moscow, Constantinople, the various Ukrainian groups involved) are messy, complicated, and subject to a number of interpretations.  At least from an international "public relations" perspective, this has not been the Orthodox Church's finest hour.

As a clergyman formally under the jurisdiction of Constantinople, I take the side of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but not out of any "blind loyalty."  In fact, some of the arguments the Ecumenical Patriarchate has made in defense of its actions seem somewhat strained: reassertion of canonical prerogatives essentially ignored for over three centuries struck me as quite curious.  After all, up until just a few months ago, the Ecumenical Patriarchate--at least publicly--considered two of the three Orthodox "jurisdictions" in Ukraine to be schismatic or uncanonical, just as the Moscow Patriarchate did.  Technically, the reassertion of canonical "rights" may have been necessary, but it is not the strong argument in the matter.

In such cases, where various aspersions and motives have been thrown around by the Moscow Patriarchate and others, I think it is simpler to ask who has what to gain in such matters.  And for this writer, it seems to me that rather than gaining anything, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is actually the only side in the controversy willing to give anything away.

From a purely ecclesiastical and canonical perspective, declaring the Ukrainian Church autocephalous actually creates a situation where Constantinople will no longer have any canonical prerogatives or "rights" in Ukraine, apart from the ability to hear "appeals" of hierarchs on canonical matters--and even this prerogative is contested by Moscow and some others.  In any case, an autocephalous church is completely self-ruling, and elects its own "head" and hierarchal primate.  From an administrative point of view, once Constantinople declares the Ukrainian Church autocephalous, it ceases to have any "rights" or prerogatives in that territory.  Unless requested, the Ecumenical Patriarchate will have no say regarding any aspect of the internal life of the Ukrainian Church.

Of course, the Ecumenical Patriarchate can expect some gain in the matter, but what is gained will be things such as the gratitude of those Ukrainians who desire to have their own autocephalous church.  Because this controversy undoubtedly involves secular politics (and there is a de facto war occurring between Ukraine and Russia), the Ecumenical Patriarchate has already received the gratitude of the secular leadership of Ukraine.  The Ukrainian government did also provide the Ecumenical Patriarchate the use of an ancient church in Kiev, but honestly this could not have been a major motivation!  The United States government applauded the move, but mostly because Russia was against it, and that rivalry is escalating to a degree not seen since the end of the Cold War.  NATO countries might sympathize as well in this geopolitical struggle, and the Ecumenical Patriarch has earned some goodwill.

But none of that, for me, compares to the pastoral accomplishment that many commentators seem to ignore.  Basically, since the independence of Ukraine, there have been three Orthodox "jurisdictions" claiming legitimacy and essentially not in communion with each other.  Whatever the actual numbers, there is no doubt that millions of Ukrainian Orthodox were negatively affected by these schisms and considered outside the communion of the Orthodox Church.  By recognizing bishops that formally and formerly were in schism with the rest of the Orthodox world, millions of Ukrainian Orthodox faithful were recognized as Orthodox by the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  The Unification Synod held recently, in preparation for the declaration of autocephaly, brought at least two of the three "jurisdictions" together--those that stood opposed to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate.

So now, not counting a sizeable Ukrainian (Byzantine) Catholic Church (known as Uniates, for they appear identical to Eastern Orthodox but are in union with Rome) in the country, the Ecumenical Patriarchate now essentially recognizes all Orthodox Christians in the country as "canonical."  On January 6, 2019, there will be two such groups: one autocephalous church recognized as such by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and one "autonomous" church under the formal jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate.  After all, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not severed communion with anyone in this matter, including the Ukrainians united still to Moscow.

What the Ecumenical Patriarchate has done, however, is most significant.  It has decided, essentially and canonically, to give up its right to being involved in this matter.  It will be up to the Ukrainians themselves to solve the remaining "jurisdictional" problem and schism.  Even if one is inclined to view this matter as one of an uncanonical "interference" by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine, there can be no doubt that once autocephaly is proclaimed and formally recognized, the Ecumenical Patriarchate cannot "interfere" or intervene on any Ukrainian matter without request and invitation.  In effect, it has tied its own hands in this matter and relinquished any "rights."

The situation in Ukraine is quite complicated, involving both ecclesiastical and civil disputes. Yet the ecclesiastical dispute, as complicated and unseemly as it seems, comes down to this: Moscow has only asserted its rights and its "possession" (and by Moscow, we must consider the Patriarchate and government to be in lock-step as has been amply demonstrated).  It has not addressed the reality of millions of faithful being formally outside the communion of the Church.  Constantinople, in contrast, brought millions of faithful back into communion and, at the same time, allowed the Ukrainians the opportunity through self-rule and self-determination, to solve their own problems.  Those problems will not disappear anytime soon.  But this significant first step must be credited to the Ecumenical Patriarchate which, contrary interpretations of the canons aside, has taken the moral high ground.